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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the behavior of Navy enlisted personnel who were eligible for the FY93
VSI (Voluntary Separation Incentive)/SSB (Special Separation Bonus) Program. The thesis uses
DMDC data on program takers as of February 1993. The objectives of the thesis are: (1) to identify
factors that influence individuals to accert or not accept a voluntary separation bonus; (2) to compare
FY93 results with FY92 results to determine if the same factors are consistent for both years of the
program; (3) to determine the forecasting accuracy of the binomial logit model in predicting VSI/SSB
behavior; and (4) to evaluate the effect of changes in the availability of transition benefits in 1993.
Both binomial and multinomial logit models are estimated to explain the decision to take a bonus, and
also which of the two options to accept. The results show that the statistically significant factors are
consistent over the two years, and are consistent with economic theory. The binomial logit model
is found to be highly accurate in predicting take behavior and program choice. Finally, meking
transition benefits available to VSI recipients increased the proportion of leavers choosing VSI. The
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. HOW FAR MUST THE FORCE REDUCTION GO?
Doing more with less has become a task of growing
importance within the Departmei.it of Defense in general, and
especially within the U.S. Navy. During this current period
of downsizing, virtually every aspect of the Navy will be
affected. The fiscal year (FY) 1994 budget authority for
national defense will exceed one trillion dollars, and when
broken down by branch of service, reveals extensive cuts for
the Department of the Navy. The $264.2 billion for outlays
in President Clinton's FY 1994 defense budget reflects a real
decline in budget authority of five percent from FY 1993, and
over twenty-four percent from FY 1990. By FY 1997, estimates
show a forty-one percent nominal decline from FY 1985. [Ref.1)
Table 1-1 provides a little more insight into just how
extensive these budget cuts are expected to be during the
1990S. The most significant portion of cuts in national
defense spending will come directly from the Department of
Defense, with the Department of Energy and other defense-
related departments carrying their share of the burden with
respect to funding cuts. It is likely that these funding
reductions will not be the bottom line. Deeper cuts may





Budget Authority 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
DOD Military 259.1 250.7 248.1 240.3 232.8 240.5
DOE & Other 13.9 12.7 13.0 13.4 13.2 13.4
Total 273.0 263.4 261.1 253.7 246.0 253.9
Annual Percent -8.5 -5.0 -3.0 -5.1 -5.0 0.0
Change (1993 Dollars)
Outlays
DOD Military 277.3 264.2 258.0 251.6 233.7 239.2
Total 290.7 276.9 270.9 264.7 246.9 252.5
Annual Percent -5.6 -6.6 -4.3 -4.5 -8.9 0.0
Change (1993 Dollars)
Source: Secretary of Defense DOD press release, 27 March 1993
The above dollar cuts will translate into significant
personnel reductions, as can be seen in the following table:
TABLE 1-2
MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
(End Strength In Thousands)
Percent Change
Active Military FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 (FY 1992-FY1994)
Army 611 575 540 -12
Navy 542 526 481 -11
Marine Corps 185 182 174 -6
Air Force 470 445 426 -9
Total Active Duty 1808 1728 1621 -10
Source: Derived from data from Secretary of Defense DOD press release,
27 March 1993
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There is a proportionate amount of hardware going away, as
well. Eleven percent of the Navy's ship battle forces is
being cut by FY 1994, which in part consists of two deployable
carriers and one active air wing. [Ref.2:p.l1] Unfortunately,
these estimates may not be the end of the cuts absorbed by the
Navy. In 1991, the Senate Armed Service Committee recommended
achieving an active duty force of 1,692,000 by FY 1995.
[Ref.2] When compared with the more recent DOD numbers in
Table 1-2, active duty military end strengths will be below
the committee recommendations by 1994; a year early. It would
appear that the force reduction is gaining momentum. The
480,000 end strength figure for FY 1994 is predicted to reach
400,000 by FY 1999-- an additional 17 percent decrease from
the amount already targeted. [Ref.3]
B. OBJECTIVES
As outlined above, there will be additional reductions in
tie numbers of active duty sailors beyond what "as already
occurred. Meeting the new end strength requirements is easier
said than done when decision makers stop and realize that
these cuts affect men and women who have volunteered to serve
their country. The current drawdown is the largest since the
inception of the all-volunteer force in 1973. This creates a
unique challenge to manpower planners, as the Navy is tasked
with eliminating from its ranks thousands of individuals who
3
... were led to believe that if they performed in a
satisfactory manner, they would be allowed to complete
a normal career and retire with an immediate pension.
(Ref.2:p.7]
The problem becomes immediately obvious; how does the Navy
meet its end strength requirements while at the same time
keeping the faith with those individuals who volunteered with
these same expectations of completing a Navy career? The
House Armed Services Committee advised that:
The force drawdown be accomplished in a balanced and
equitable fashion that will preserve the integrity of
the military, maintain adequate force readiness, and
cushion the blow for adversely affected career
personnel. (Ref.2:p.7]
The reductions necessary to meet congressionally-mandated
limits will be accomplished. The Navy has at its disposal
several methods, or tools, which will be used in varying
degrees to meet end strengths, while at the same time,
"preserve the integrity of the military."
This thesis will look briefly at the methods that the Navy
is using to reach its targets, and will focus on one
particular method- - the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) /
Special Separation Benefit (SSB) program. This program
provides qualified individuals who choose to voluntarily leave
active duty with a choice between two cash and benefits
packages (if approved for separation by the Secretary of The
Navy). This thesis will compare VSI/SSB acceptance rates from
FY 1993 with those from FY 1992, providing additional data
4
from which to make observations concerning trends within the
program. The 1993 data will also be used to develop a model
to determine which varial. s are significant in the decision
to voluntarily separate, and to be used to predict future
program separation rates.
Chapte- 11 of this thesis presents a more in-depth look at
the VSI/SSB program, including eligibility, non-pecuniary
benefits, and the actual dollar amounts involved. In
addition, literature applicable to individual career decision
making, especially military career choices, will be presented.
An understanding of how the perceived environment influences
an individual's decision-making is extremely useful in
forecasting how groups will react.
Chapter III presents the data, along with any restrictions
or assumptions made, which were used to determine significant
variables in the choice of whether or not to accept VSI/SSB,
and if so, which to accept?
Chapter IV contains the results of estimation of the
multivariate (logit) models developed in Chapter III.
Substantial change- in the nonpecuniary benefits between VSI
and SSB occurred in FY 1993, and hopefully the results from
the model will reflect how these changes affected acceptance
behavior.
This chapter also compares the FY 1992 and FY 1993
results, pointing out any significant trends between the two
groups of VSI/SSB-eligible individuals, and the decisions
5
made. Future offerings of this voluntary separation program
can be more effectively targeted with additional data on who
did, and who did not, accept, and which option was considered
to be most attractive. Chapter V will present the conclusions
drawn from Chapter IV, along with any policy recommendations
warranted by the results.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The focus of this thesis is the VSI/SSB program, and
therefore the primary research question concerns voluntary
separation acceptance, and the choice between VSI versus SSB.
Analysis of the 1993 results (from the start of the FY93
program through February 1993) may lend assistance in
answering the following additional questions:
"* Were the outcomes of the three phases of VSI/SSB in FY
1993 similar to the program results in FY 1992?
"* Given the analysis of FY 1992 VSI/SSB data and the results
of this thesis for FY 1993, can the Navy now more
accurately forecast who is most likely to accept a
separation bonus, and if so, which bonus program will be
accepted?
"* Did changes to the associated benefits packages have the
desired effect of increasing the percentage of VSI




As emphasized in the introduction, the challenge faced by
the Navy is one of reducing its numbers while at the same time
maintaining an effective, adequate, and well-trained fighting
force. Force shaping-- avoiding the "hollow force" that is
mentioned frequently-- is as much a part of the reduction as
meeting end strength goals. It is dangerous to haphazardly
cut personnel (because that's where the quick savings can be
made) without ensuring that the numbers of experienced men and
women needed to maintain the world's most capable Navy are
available. Reduced accessions and involuntary separations
could be used to reach end strength goals, but the costs
associated with such a policy would be immense. Fortunately,
policy-makers have given consideration to the spillover
effects associated with the available options before deciding
how to go about the reductions. The potential impact of the
various policies on morale, readiness, local and national
economies, and the fates of those separated are just a few of
the considerations.
The Navy has chosen several methods, or tools, to
accomplish the necessary reductions. The approach involves
paring down over-manned skill areas and paygrades where
7
crowding has created promotion bottlenecks. A key
consideration is to avoid cutting too deeply, thereby creating
a serious undermanned condition. Figure 1 provides an
overview of the Navy's approach to the downsizing challenge,
showing what methods will be applied, and where. The
remaining section discusses these methods.
60.000 6 Reduce Accessions
50.000
ENCORE-.-- vSI/ssB ."ER
40.000 S B- 
Y
30.000
IS-R r 77R WaiverSRetironent F
20,00024-yr Lon gevity Pay Raise
0
1 2 3 4 s 1 7 10 11 12 13 14 Is 16 I? 1 19 2 21 21 23 24 21 26 7 23 29 30
Yom of Srvice
UE1PJ3 0 E4/516 M E7/81
Figure 1.
Shaping The Active Duty Force
Source: RADM M.W. Bordy lecture at Naval Postgraduate School,
20 April 1993.
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B. ACCOMPLISHING THE REDUCTION
Reducing accessions is a viable method for cutting the
active duty numbers, and as such is being used by the Navy.
This method cannot be used to bear the total burden of the
force reduction because it would create severe shortages in
certain paygrades later, but it can take its share of the
cuts. Table 2-1 shows actual and projected active duty Navy
enlisted accessions for FY 1990 through FY 1994. The right-
most column shows the percent change in accessions as compared
with the previous year.
TABLE 2-1
ACCESSIONS AND THE DRAWDOWN






Source: Navy Bureau of Personnel
The FY 1994 prediction, if accurate, will represent a 29
percent decrease in accessions between FY 1990 and FY 1994.
Second on the list of force shaping tools is the ENCORE
program. This program centralizes the approval authority for
term reenlistments at the Navy Bureau of Personnel level, as
opposed to the previous authority of individual commanding
officers to approve reenlistments. This provides force
9
planners with the flexibility to shift qualified reenlistees
from over-manned ratings to those that are undermanned. Table
2-2 provides the ENCORE results for calendar year (CY) 1992.
TABLE 2-2




Number of Rate Conversions Approved 2,293
Separations due to Quota
Unavailability 945
Note: remaining requests received by BUPERS are either in
work, under consideration, or were withdrawn.
Source: RADM L.F. Gunn, 24 November 1992 lecture at the Naval
Postgraduate School
The fifteen year retirement, having been accepted for use
within the Department of the Navy, is another tool that has
received a great deal of publicity. Congress has authorized
the Department of Defense to implement this, if necessary,
through 30 September 1995. This program targets specific
individuals between the fifteenth and twentieth years of
service. Eligible individuals will receive pay and benefits
similar to those currently available under the present
retirement system. Payments would be received according to
the following schedule:
10
2.5 percent X base pay X YOS (less 1 percent for each
year under twenty years of service)
This program will target specific groups of individuals as the
needs of the Navy require.
One option that the Department of Defense has provided to
Navy commanding officers is that of "early outs." Commanding
officers are authorized to approve voluntary separation of
enlisted members up to six months prior to an individual's
expiration of active obligated service (EAOS). As of April
1993, 633 active duty sailors have left active duty in
accordance with this program.
At the other end of the career path, Selective Early
Retirement (SER) has been, and is being, used to assist in the
efforts at shaping a declining force. Selected retirement-
eligible individuals who meet the criteria will be separated
from active duty with retirement benefits corresponding to
their paygrade and years of service (YOS). By 31 July 1994,
the following numbers of individuals will be separated under
the SER prog.im: 200 E-7s, 450 E-8s, and 150 E-9s. These are
not drastically large numbers; the E-9 target, for example,
represents only one percent of the Navy's E-9 total. This is
just one of the various methods currently in use.
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, although
not a program aimed at force reduction, can be used both as a
force shaping tool and a method to assist in reaching targeted
11
end strengths. The Navy has approximately $100 million for FY
1993 with which to provide reenlistment bonuses to induce
skilled individuals in undermanned ratings to remain on active
duty. Significant research has been done concerning the
effects that these bonuses have on retention and reenlistment.
One such study, "The Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses
on Retention," by Donald J. Cymrot, showed that there was
indeed a significant relationship between the selective bonus
program and retention in the Marine Corps. [Ref.4:p.IV) An
interesting aspect of this study is that it also provides an
indication of the effects of removing the bonus program.
Following short periods (2-5 months) of SRB suspension due to
temporary fund depletion, there was a notable decrease in
reenlistment in what would have otherwise been SRB-targeted
occupational specialties. For one period the decrease in
retention reached 13 percent. [Ref.4:p.V]
One consideration when adjusting the use of SRB to
influence retention behavior is what can be called the "YOS
effect." The years of service an individual has, reflected by
his or her paygrade, haL a significant impact on the
effectiveness of decreasing the bonuses. The Cymrot study
looked at bonus effects across differing paygrades, not just
military occupational specialties (MOS). He discovered that
the bonus (or loss of) had a decreasing effect on individuals
as their paygrade increased. This is attributed to the growing
influence that retirement has -1 the individual as
12
eligibility approaches. Targeted individuals E-6 and higher,
for example, were highly likely to reenlist without the SRB.
E-ls through E-5s in the study, however, were significantly
influenced by the bonus program. [Ref.4:p.591 From this study
it can be inferred that personnel reductions are possible in
what were considered critical areas through cuts in the
current SRB program, provided such reductions are in line with
Navy policy.
Another subtle method to influence retention behavior is
through adjustments in High Year Tenure (HYT). This is a way
of paring down mid- and upper-level enlisted ranks without
affecting the retirement eligibility of the targeted
individuals, while at the same time making more room at the
top for promotions. The HYT numbers represent the limit to
time-in-rate for respective paygrades before individuals would
be mandatorily separated or retired. These separations are
part of the Navy's "up-or-out" philosophy. Table 2-3 shows
the changes that have recently been made in the HYT numbers.
TABLE 2-3
FY 1994 HYT CHANGES
PAYGRADE
Year E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9
FY 1993 10 20 23 26 28 30
FY 1994 10 20 20 24 26 30
Source: RADM M.W. Bordy lecture, Naval Postgraduate School,
20 April 1993
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As can be seen, these changes do not affect members who have
yet to reach retirement eligibility.
The Navy has also changed advancement opportunities
throughout the higher paygrades. These changes have a
significant impact on reenlistment decisions and on overall
career planning. As pointed out by Russell W. Beland in his
study "Military Retirement, Voluntary Separations, and the
Reduction of the Armed Forces," missing a promotion is very
similar to being offered a voluntary separation in that both
can be a ". .. signal to members that the military places a
relatively low value on their services. [Both] also suggest
the potential of being involuntarily separated in the future."
[Ref.5:p.416] Table 2-4 reflects the changes in advancement




Paygrade Historical Sep 91 Mar 92 Sep 92 Mar-Sep 93
E-5 22 17 11 12 10
E-6 19 16 10 8 7
Historical 1991 1992 1993 Proj. 1994
E-7 22 22 21 12 10
E-8 13 19 15 8 7
E-9 24 24 22 18 4
Source: RADM M.W. Bordy lecture Naval Postgraduate School
20 April 1993
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These advancement rate changes, together with HYT and the
voluntary separation incentives, present a relatively benign
method of reducing the size of the enlisted paygrades. As
previously suggested by Beland, individuals who fail to
advance may, in fact, see the writing on the wall and choose
to leave active duty in the numbers needed to prevent an
involuntary reduction-in-force (RIF). This has been a goal of
the Navy, and has so far been successful. Other services have
had to resort to involuntarily separating large numbers of
their active duty force, which can have serious spillover
effects on morale and accessions. Even the methods described
above are not without negative effects on the morale of the
force. The publicity and rumors surrounding the force
reduction have created an air of uncertainty among the
enlisted ranks. Military duty is arduous enough without added
concern over whether or not members will have their jobs a
month or year from now.
The voluntary separation program (VSI/SSB) has been
mentioned several times, and what follows is an overview of
the program. As outlined by the FY 1992 National Defense
Authorization Act, qualified service members who accept and
are approved for the program must choose between two
payment/benefit options in exchange for voluntarily leaving
active duty.
15
The VSI option provides an annuity-type payment plan whose
value and payment methoM are based on the following formula:
final month's
Annual VSI amount - 2.5 percent x base pay x 12 x YOS
(where the total number of payments equals twice the member's
years of service.)
The SSB option provides a lump sum cash payment, the value of
which is figured according to the following formula:
final month's
Total SSB payment = 15 percent x base pay x 12 x YOS
Accepting SSB will obligate the member to serve three years in
the Ready Reserve, while the VSI option means an obligation
that is as long as the period of the VSI payments. The VSI
payments will also be affected by any military retirement or
Reserve drill pay, which will be deducted from VSI. SSB
recipients will have to pay back certain amounts at the time
military retirement payments begin. There are other
restrictions and considerations, but this covers the main
points.
Also as mentioned, individuals must be eligible and
qualified for the program. Program eligibility is based on
rating, YOS, and paygrade, with exceptions made for specific
reasons. For example, certain Navy enlisted codes (NECs) are
16
ineligible, as are explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), divers,
and SEALs. Individuals must be eligible for reenlistment and
retention, not on limited duty, not in training for an NEC
that is ineligible, and not awaiting disciplinary action or
administrative separation. Also, members must have five years
of continuous service prior to separation, and six years of
active duty as of 5 December, 1991.
The FY 1993 program was offered in three separate phases.
Each phase targeted slightly different groups, and provided
separation dates that were phase-specific. Members who
accepted and were approved under phase 1 were separated from
active duty by 31 December, 1992. Phase 2 and phase 3
separations had to be effected by 31 January, 1993 and 31
March 1993, respectively. The benefits package offered with
both the VSI and SSB is shown in Table 2-5.
All eleven benefits listed in Table 2-5 were available
only with the SSB option prior to phase 3 of the FY 1993
program. VSI for FY 1992 and the first two phases of FY 1993
offered only the first three-benefits outlined in Table 2-5.
Recent legislation made the benefits packages equal (both
programs offered all eleven benefits) and retroactive for all
members who accepted the program in FY 1993. However, by the
time this information was available, only the phase 3
applicants had yet to make the decision between VSI and SSB.
Had the phase 1 and phase 2 applicants known of the equalized
benefits packages, they might have made different choices
17
between VSI and SSB. The impact of this will be analyzed in
a later chapter of this thesis.
TABLE 2-5
VSI/SSB NONPECUNIARY BENEFITS
* Employment assistance, pre-separation counseling, and
overseas relocation assistance.
* One year storage of household goods.
* Twenty days of permissive TDY or excess leave (without
pay) for job/house hunting (thirty days if OCONUS).
* Travel to home of selection, if within CONUS.
* Preferential Reserve billet assignment.
* 180 days continued use of military housing after
separation.
0 One-time preference for employment in certain base
positions.
0 Two years commissary and exchange privileges.
* 120 days traditional health care.
* Extension in DODDS system if dependent(s) have completed
eleventh grade by sponsor's separation.
* Montgomery G.I. Bill enrollment ($1,200 contribution).
Source: Chief of Naval Operations VSI/SSB implementation
message, 092320Z Nov 92
Table 2-6 provides a brief overview of the dollar value,
by paygrade and YOS (ten to fifteen years), of both VSI and
SSB. Also included are present value calculations for each
paygrade at the ten and fifteen year point. Seven percent was
used as the discount rate to obtain present values and provide
18
a reasonable basis for comparison of the current dollar value




Pav1rade i0 i1 12 13 14 15
H-5 SSB 26,692 29,361 33,210 35,978 39,448 42,266
total VSI 88,980 107,668 132,840 155,896 184,100 211,320
annual VSI
payment 4,449 4,894 5,535 5,996 6,575 7,044
present value
of VSI 47,132 ........ 87,409
E-6 SSB 29,214 32,135 36,865 39,937 44,355 47,523
total VSI 97,380 117,832 147,456 173,056 206,976 237,600
annual VSI
payment 4,869 5,356 6,144 6,656 7,392 7,920
present value
of VSI 51,582 ........ 98,279
R-7 SSB 32,848 36,133 40,649 44,036 49,517 53,112
total VSI 109,500 132,484 162,600 190,814 231,336 265,560
annual VSI
payment 5,475 6,022 6,775 7,339 8,262 8,852
present value
of VSI 58,200 ........ 109,844
Source: Department of Defense Office of Compensation figures
As can be seen by the highlighted figures, the present
value of VSI payments is considerably higher than the lump-sum
value of SSB. Previous research into the actual acceptance
rates for FY 1992 between the two options revealed that SSB
was, by far, the more popular of the two. Approximately
eighty-five percent of the service members approved for the
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program selected SSB over VSI. [Ref.6:p.551 It is obvious
that the dollar value was not the driving factor in this
decision. It appears that the method of payment and the
associated benefits (as mentioned previously) figured greatly
in the choice.
Although there is not a great deal of literature
specifically associated with voluntary separation incentives,
research has been conducted on the stay/leave military
decision and can be applied to the VSI/SSB voluntary
separation decision. One well-known and widely-applied
approach to modelling retention has become known as the ACOL,
or the Annualized Cost of Leaving, model. This approach is
relatively unique among decision forecasting models in that it
incorporates a variable for the nonpecuniary aspects of
civilian and military life in its development.
As mentioned earlier, the VSI/SSB program is designed to
influence service members to leave active duty who otherwise
would have remained. It is hoped that the program is not just
providing an exit bonus to individuals who would have left the
service anyway. As an example, the FY 1993 VSI/SSB program
had 17 years as its maximum YOS. At the seventeen-year point,
it has been shown that the retirement effect is extremely
strong, and individuals have demonstrated a preference for
military life. The incentive needed to get these individuals
who are almost retirement-eligible to leave would predictably
be large. For these reasons, the cost of leaving varies
20
significantly across different paygrades, as one would expect.
As a matter of fact, preference for military life in general
is assumed to fit a logistic distribution. [Ref.4:p.27)
Briefly, ACOL is based on several components. The first
component is the value of the income stream if the individual
stays:
t÷S




0 RS is the expected present value of s more years of
military service;
n . is the expected military pay in year j;
"* Rt+s is the present value of retirement after serving t+s
years;
" Wt+s is the present value of civilian wages after t+s
years of military service;
"* d is equal to 1/(1+p) where p is the individual's rate of
time preference. [Ref.7:p.25]
Equation (1) provides the dollar value of continued
military service as of a specific point in time. If a service
member leaves immediately, the dollar value can be estimated
by using equation (2):
RL = Rt + Wt (2)
Rt and Wt represent the present values of military retirement
and the civilian wage stream for an individual who leaves at
21
time t. The cost of leaving equation, then, incorporates the
two portions above along with a new variable, 6, which
represents the net preference for civilian life. The model
assumes that a person will stay in the military so long as the
present value of the difference between RS and RL is positive






The result is the cost in dollars of leaving the military. As
shown, this model incorporates the nonpecuniary aspects of
civilian and military life. By analyzing historical data on
stay/go decisions, along with estimates for expected civilian
and military pay streams, the cost of leaving variable can be
estimated. ACOL can then be incorporated in a logistic
equation to estimate the probability of staying in the
military:
P(staying)11 +e - (a, -PIACOL)
(4)
Where (ar+OI3 ACOL) is the logit model.
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The development of the ACOL model provides a quantitative
approach to the premise that:
Economic theory suggests that the decision to leave
military service would be based on a comparison of
total current monetary compensation, nonpecuniary
benefits, and appropriately discounted retirement
benefits in the military versus the most lucrative
civilian package available. [Ref.5:p.414]
Theory suggests that individuals who enter the military
voluntarily will remain on active duty until the combination
of military and post-military civilian compensation (including
nonpecuniary aspects) is at its greatest value. ACOL helps to
quantify this value. tRef.5:p.414]
Armed with this economic theory, military policy-makers
can better influence service members' decision making as the
needs of the military dictate. The Navy in particular can
directly influence the monetary portion of the equations above
through pay, bonuses, and incentives such as VSI/SSB.
However, the Navy can also inadvertently influence
individuals' tastes for military life through the atmosphere
created during the drawdown.
The degree to which VSI/SSB decisions are influenced by
perceived changes in the likelihood of reaching retirement
eligibility is uncertain, but theory suggests that the effect
is significant. Given the nature of military retirement, it
does not make sense to leave active duty after ten or fifteen
years of service, unless unanticipated decreases in
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compensation occur. [Ref.5:p.415] The threat of being
involuntarily separated or facing a future with shrinking
advancement opportunities could be viewed as unanticipated
compensation reductions. Over twelve percent of the VSI/SSB
offers in FY 1992 were accepted, and these were made to what
were previously considered career service members. The
remainder of this thesis analyzes the FY 1993 takers to
determine if there is a pattern to VSI/SSB acceptance, and in
the attributes of the takers.
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
Information on both the eligible population and those
members who accepted either VSI or SSB was provided by the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Two separate data files
were provided. The first data set contained information on
Navy enlisted personnel who accepted either VSI or SSB under
the FY 1993 program, through February 1993. This data set
contained 2,992 observations of "takers." The second data set
used was the DMDC version of the Navy Enlisted Master File
(EMF) as of 30 September 1992. This data set did not identify
those individuals who were eligible, therefore it was
necessary to separate the bonus-eligible individuals from the
EMF. This was accomplished using the program qualification
criteria outlined in the FY 1993 Enlisted Voluntary Separation
Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB) Program
message. [Ref.10] This message specified the eligible rates,
paygrades, and years of service, as well as specific NECs that
were ineligible for the FY :093 program, by phase. The merged
data set, now consisting of both eligible non-takers from the
enlisted master file and bonus-takers from the DMDC "taker"
file, contained 26,325 observations. There were three phases,
separated by date, in the FY 1993 VSI/SSB program. The first
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phase ended on 31 December 1992, while the second and third
phases ended on 31 January 1993 and 31 March 1993,
respectively. Phases 2 and 3 expanded bonus eligibility over
the previous phase by adding several ratings and, in some
cases, relaxing the years of service criterion.
B. MODEL CONSTRUCTION
In order to determine what factors were significant in
the decision to accept or not accept a separation bonus, and
which bonus to accept if such was the case, several binomial
logit models were specified. The binomial logit model is the
most widely-accepted method of regression analysis when the
dependent variable is of a binary nature and the response
function is non-linear. [Ref 7:p.518) Multinomial logit
models were also estimated for the above decisions, and an
explanation of the method and results appears in the appendix.
The binomial logit model utilizes the equation below in its
calculations to determine the probability that an individual
will make the decision corresponding to Di = 1.
Di = _ (•+ 1•÷,
l+e
Where: (5)
"* e = base of the natural logarithm
" = constant
" 01, 02 = parameters to be estimated
"* X1, X2 = explanatory variables
"* E = stochastic error term (assumed to follow cumulative
logistic distribution)
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Given the above equation, the values for Di are limited
to values (probabilities) between 0 and 1, and the model
coefficients can be used to determine the effect selected
variables have on the "log of the odds" that the choice in
question will be made. [Ref 7:p.519] Linear probability
models are not as accurate in this type of analysis due to the
fact that linear probability models do not limit Di (accept or
not accept, for example) to values between 0 and 1. The
linear probability approach makes interpreting the results
easier because the coefficients represent the impact of a one-
unit change in one of the independent variables, holding the
others constant, on the probability of Di equaling 1.
However, the accuracy is questionable. Three logit models for
the TAKE decision were estimated: one for the total
population, one for phases 1 and 2 combined, and one for phase
3. Logit models for the VSI versus SSB decision were
estimated using the total sample of takers, and for those
takers in phase 3.
Specification of the models involved choosing those
variables that are most relevant to an individual's decision
(take versus not take, and VSI versus SSB). In addition,
hypotheses were developed concerning the direction of the
effect of each variable. In order to make comparisons between
the results of the FY 1992 program and the results for FY 1993
in this thesis, the variables selected approximated those used
in Shrinking The Force: Effects of the Navy's Separation
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Incentive Program, by Professor Stephen L. Mehay and
Lieutenant Mary Kirby of the Naval Postgraduate School.
[Ref.8] The variables, and how they were coded for use in the
logit models, are shown in Table 3-1.
Having decided upon the models and the variables to be
used, the next step, as previously mentioned, was to
hypothesize the signs of the variables. The general equations
and expected signs are shown below.
+
TAKE - f(MINORITY, AFQT, MALE, YOS, GRADE, MARRIED, CHILD,
+ + -+
MILSPS, HSD, NONGRAD, UNEMP, ADVRATE, HITECH)
-+ - _+
VSI = f(MINORITY, AFQT, MALE, YOS, MARRIED, CHILD, MILSPS,
-- + +
NONGRAD, UNEMP, HITECH, PHASE3)
The explanation for the hypothesized signs follows the
explanation found in Mehay and Kirby (1993).
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TABLE 3-1
VARIABLES USED IN LOGISTIC ANALYSIS
Dependent
Variables Definition Values
TAKE Accept separation bonus 1=member accepted
O=did not accept




MINORITY White or non-white 1=minority, O=white
AFQT AFQT score Entered as raw score
MALE Gender of individual 1=male, O=female
YOS Years of service Number of years
GRADE Paygrade of individual 1=E-6, O=E-5 or E-7
MARRIED Marital status l=married, O=not
CHILD Number of children Total number
MILSPS Military spouse 1=military spouse
O=single or non-military spouse
NONGRAD Non-high school grad 1=non-grad, college
O=grad
HSD High school grad 1=high school grad
O=non-grad, college
UNEMP Unemployment rate for Percentage
home of record in 1992
ADVRATE Advancement rates for Percentage
individual ratings
HITECH Technical ratings 1=hitech, O=other
PHASE3 Separated members who 1=accepted bonus in phase 3
accepted bonuses by phase O=accepted in phase 1 or 2
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In the TAKE model, the variable MINORITY is expected to
have a negative effect as reenlistment rates are generally
higher for minority groups than for whites [Ref. 6: p.45].
AFQT is expected to be positive, as are HSD and HITECH,
reflecting increased civilian job opportunities for better-
educated, better-trained individuals. Because men generally
have higher retention rates than women, [Ref.6:p.461 MALE is
hypothesized to be negative. MARRIED and CHILD are both
expected to have negative signs, as previous reseatch
indicates that individuals with dependents have a tendency to
remain in the military. [Ref.6:p.44] YOS and GRADE are
hypothesized to negatively associated with the take decision,
as service members who approach retirement eligibility are
less likely to voluntarily separate. MILSPS is hypothesized
to have a positive effect due to the fact that individuals who
voluntarily separate and have a military spouse receive many
of the same benefits they were entitled to while on active
duty. Also, the increasing difficulty of managing dual
military career families provides additional support for this
hypothesized effect. UNEMP, the unemployment rate in the
individual's home state, is forecasted to have a negative
effect. It is assumed that many of the separated service
members will return to their homes of record, and the local
employment prospects will affect their decisions [Ref.
6:p.49]. ADVRATE is expected to be negative, indicating that
increased advancement opportunities means a decreasing
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likelihood of separating. Finally, NONGRAD is hypothesized to
have a negative effect on the TAKE decision. Individuals with
limited civilian employment opportunities are likely to stay
in the military. One significant variable difference between
the TAKE model and the VSI model is the addition of the PHASE3
variable to the VSI model. This variable is hypothesized to
have a positive effect on the decision to accept VSI versus
SSB, once the decision to TAKE has been made. This goes back
to the discussion on the non-pecuniary benefits packages
associated with each of the decisions. Individuals making
their VSI/SSB decisions prior to the phase 3 "window" (31
January 1993 to 31 March 1993) were not aware that the FY 1993
Defense Authorization Act had equalized the benefits for VSI
and SSB. During phase 3, however, this information became
available to eligible members and it is expected that this
would influence a greater percentage of individuals in phase
3 to choose VSI over SSB, as compared to the previous two
phases. VSI had a greater present value and also equivalent
associated benefits for the phase 3 decision makers.
C. MARGINAL PROBABILITIES
Following the construction of the models, it was
necessary to determine the individual effect that the selected
variables had on the probability of accepting a separation
bonus. The analysis also needed to determine the effect of
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each explanatory variable on the probability of accepting VSI,
once the decision to accept a separation bonus had been made.
Of primary interest was the PHASE3 variable and how the change
in phase (embodying the additional benefits information) would
affect the probability of accepting VSI. In conjunction with
the logit model analysis, it is possible to define a "notional
person" and to calculate the change in the probability of
taking a separation bonus when one independent variable is
allowed to change. The other independent variables are held
constant during this procedure, making the probability
analysis more accurate. The notional person used in this
analysis is defined below, and the results of the marginal
probability calculations appear in the following chapter. The
TAKE notional person used in these calculations is a white
male, single, with no children. The unemployment rate in his
home state is 7.36, he has 12.6 years of service, is an E-6,
faced an average advancement rate last cycle of 5.44 percent,
and scored 64.5 on the AFQT. He is a high school graduate.
The VSI notional person is also a white wale, z.
dependents, and a high school graduate. He has 11.6 years of
service, scored 67.6 on the AFQT, and is also an E-6. These
attributes are arbitrary; it is up to the analyst to determine
what the notional (average) person will look like. The
descriptions above are based on the overall composition of the
samples (using mean values where applicable).
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D. MODEL FORECASTING
The next step in the analysis was to determine a method
to measure the forecasting ability of logit models similar to
the ones used in this analysis. A method for using logit
models for prediction is presented in Logit Modeling:
Practical Applications, by Alfred Demaris. [Ref.91 The FY
1992 model (Mehay and Kirby,1993) was chosen to be the test
model. [Ref.8:p.17] Using the logit coefficients found in the
results of the FY 1992 model and the data from FY 1993,
calculations could be made that tested the model's predictive
accuracy on FY 1993 data. The following series of equations
provides the basis for this analysis. The value of the first
equation, L, equates to the logit value for each of the
observations.
L=1o +f1Xl +•2X2 +03X3
(6)
The value of the previous equation is then changed to a




A prediction success threshold was set at p (the probability
of Di = 1) equal to .5. This means that if the predicted
probability of an individual accepting VSI or SSB was greater
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than .5, that individual was considered a taker; less than .5,
and the individual was considered a non-taker. These
calculated TAKE rates were then compared to the actual TAKE
behavior for FY 1993 to determine how accurate the previous
year's model was at predicting the current year's behavior.
Also, the actual VSI acceptance rates were compared with the
FY 1992 model predictions using the above method. This
procedure was tested on a specific group within the population
of eligibles to determine the model's accuracy at predicting
group behavior. Paygrades E-5 and E-6 for both decision
models were selected as test subsets. The results of the
prediction accuracy are presented in Chapter IV.
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IV. RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of the four binomial
logit models outlined in Chapter III. Two models for the take
decisionand two models for the choice between VSI and SSB are
presented. Included are each model's relevant variables and
their effects on the selected dependent variables. Also
included is a comparison of these results, using FY93 data,
with the results of using FY92 data in Shrinking The Force:
Effects of the Navy's Separation Incentive Program, by
Professor Stephen L. Mehay and LT Mary Kirby of the Naval
Postgraduate School. [Ref.8] This approach will highlight any
trends in acceptance behavior over the two years of the
voluntary separation incentive program, point out variables
that remain significant over the two year life of the program,
and indicate the reliability of the logit predicting model.
Following the logit results is an analysis of the
marginal probabilities associated with the explanatory
variables in each model. The analysis of the marginal
probabilities provides an estimate of the individual effects
of selected independent variables on the decision to accept a
separation bonus, and as mentioned earlier in this thesis,
which type of bonus to accept.
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An analysis of the forecasting accuracy of the logit model
is also conducted. It focuses on the ability of the
Mehay/Kirby model (Mehay and Kirby,1993) to predict the
behavior of the FY93 bonus-eligible population. This
approach, as outlined in Chapter III, is used to forecast both
the acceptance (take/not take) and the program choice (VSI or
SSB) decisions.
B. ELIGIBLE POPULATION
Table 4-1 provides an overview of program acceptance
rates for both FY92 and FY93. Tables 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5
provide the means of the relevant variables for the FY93
VSI/SSB eligible populations compared with FY92, and also of
the samples that did not separate and the samples that
accepted VSI. Logit models for the take/not take decision are
run on the total sample of eligibles and also on the group who
were eligible during phases 1 and 2, so that comparison of
these two groups can be made. The logit models for the choice
between VSI and SSB are run on the total sample, and also on
the group who were eligible and made their decision during
phase 3 of the FY93 program (31 Jan 93 to 31 Mar 93).
Of interest in Table 4-1 is the fact that the overall
bonus acceptance rate was approximately equal in the two
years. Also, the overall VSI acceptance rate for FY93 was
approximately 10.6 percent, while that number increased to
12.9 percent for the decision makers in phase 3. As
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previously mentioned, it is hypothesized that the greater
availability of transition benefits was responsible for the
increase in VSI acceptance among bonus takers, and this simple
statistic lends support to this premise.
TABLE 4-1
NUMBER OF SAILORS ELIGIBLE FOR VSI/SSB PROGRAM
AND NUMBER (AND PERCENT) OF TAKERS BY
FISCAL YEAR AND PHASE
r FY9 3 b
FY92a ALL PHASE PHASE
1&2 3
NUMBER ELIGIBLE 31,872 24,076 22,743 24,076
NUMBER TAKERS 3,876 2,840 2,235 605
(% of eligibles) (12.2%) (11.8%)
NUMBER ACCEPTING VSI 589 300 222 78
(% of takers) (15.2%) (10.6%) (9.9%) (12.9%)
NUMBER ACCEPTING SSB 3,287 2,540 2,013 527
(% of takers) (84.8%) (89.4%) (90.1%) (87.1%)
Source: a Figures derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel
data for FY92b Figures based on data provided by DMDC for FY93
Table 4-2 shows the means of the relevant variables for
the bonus-eligible populations for FY92 and FY93. Notable
differences in Table 4-2 between the FY92 and FY93 eligible
populations can be seen in minority representation and the
education variables. Minority representation was higher in the
FY92 sample (37.2 percent versus only 23 percent in the FY93
sample), while the FY93 population reflected higher AFQT
scores (a 10.2 percent increase over FY92) and a greater
37
percentage of high school graduates. Also, the proportion of
eligibles in FY93 who were in hi-tech fields was almost double
the proportion in FY92. This difference may reflect recent
efforts by the Navy to fill the ranks with high quality high
school graduates.
TABLE 4-2
MEANS OF REL•.VANT VARIABLES FOR THE VSI/SSB
PROGRAM ELIGIBLE POPULATIONS IN FY92 AND FY93













HS GRAD 82.0 85.3
HI TECH 20.1 39.4
GRADE(% E-6) 70.2 61.4
AFQT(raw score) 58.5 64.5
Source: a Figures derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel
data for FY92b Figures based on data provided by DMDC for FY93
Table 4-3 shows the mean values of the explanatory
variables used in the Take and VSI acceptance models for those
who voluntarily separated in FY92 and FY93. The sample of
FY93 eligibles who separated appears to be more educated than
the FY92 group; the proportion of high school graduates among
the FY93 leavers is 86.2 percent, versus only 78.1 percent for
38
FY92 leavers. Minority representation decreased among leavers
between the FY92 and FY93 samples, falling from 23.6 percent
in FY92 to only 14.6 percent in FY93. Other than the
differences noted, the two samples appear to be very similar,
as the eligibility criteria for the programs during FY92 and
FY93 were similar.
TABLE 4-3
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR ELIGIBLE SAILORS
VOLUNTARILY SEPARATED IN FY92 AND FY93













HS GRAD 78.1 86.2
HI TECH ---- 43.2
GRADE (% E-6) 58.8 51.8
AFQT(raw score) 60.7 67.6
Source: a Figures derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel
data for FY92b Figures based on data provided by DMDC for FY93
Table 4-4 shows the mean values of selected demographic
and explanatory variables for the FY92 and FY93 eligible
personnel who chose not to accept a separation bonus. For the
stay-rs, with the exception of a decrease in minority
representation (down from 38.8 percent in FY92 to 24.1 percent
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in FY93) and an increase in educational achievement (average
AFQT scores increased from 58.1 in FY92 to 64.1 in FY93) the
two samples are relatively similar. It is also of interest to
note that the FY93 samples in each category reflected an
increase in the number of children, with little if any change
in the MARRIED percentages. The logit models should indicate
if this difference in the number of dependents has a
significant effect on the decision to accept a separation
bonus.
TABLE 4-4
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR STAYERS
IN FY92 AND FY93













HS GRAD 82.5 85.2
HI TECH N/A 34.8
AFQT(raw score) 58.1 64.1
Source: a Figures derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel
data for FY92b Figures based on data provided by DMDC for FY93
Table 4-5 presents the means of the relevant variables
for VSI takers. Minority representation among FY92 VSI takers
compared to FY93 takers was 22.4 percent versus 9.3 percent.
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Also, the percentage of males accepting VSI in FY93 stands out
over the FY92 figure, with an increase from 83.2 percent in
FY92 to 92.0 percent in FY93. High school graduates also saw
an increasing share of the VSI group in FY93, increasing from
79 percent to 81 percent between the two years. As a great
deal of the analysis in this thesis concerns the behavior of
the phase 3 decision makers, Table 4-6 is included. This
table compares the means of the relevant variables for VSI
takers in phase 3 with the overall taker population of phase
3 to determine if there are noticeable differences between
these two groups. The table reveals no significant
differences in the two samples, indicating that the phase 3
takers are fairly similar. A large amount of research in this
thesis concerns the behavior or decision makers in phase 3 of
the FY93 program in both the "Take" and VSI decisions. A
comparison of the means in Tables 4-3 and 4-6, the total
sample of FY93 takers compared with the FY93 phase 3 takers,
reveals only slight differences. The percentage of phase 3
takers in highly technical jobs was five percent less than the
overall taker percentage. Also, the overall percentage of
takers with military spouses was 7.3 percent, while phase 3
takers had a MILSPS percentage of 3.8 percent. Other than
this, there were no extreme variations in the composition of
the overall FY93 taker sample and phase 3 subsample that might
account for differences in the take rates for the two groups.
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A comparison of Table 4-5, the total sample of members
accepting VSI in FY93 (column 2), with Table 4-6, the FY93
phase 3 VSI takers (column 2), reveals some differences.
Minority representation increased from 9.3 percent overall to
14.1 percent in the phase 3 group. Average years of service
for the entire sample was 12.5, decreasing to 11.3 for the
phase 3 sample. In addition, the total sample's married
percentage was 74.7 percent, increasing to 79.5 percent when
looking only at phase 3 individuals. In summary, those who
waited until phase 3 to accept VSI differed from non-phase 3
takers by having a higher minority representation, fewer years
of service, and a higher proportion of married persons.
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TABLE 4-5
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR VSI TAKEPS
IN FY92 AND FY93
(in percent, unless noted)
FY92 FY93











HS GRAD 79.0 81.0
HI TECH ---- 38.0
AFQT(raw score) 63.5 68.2
Source: a Figures derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel data
for FY92b Figures based on data provided by DMDC for FY93
TABLE 4-6
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR FY93 PHASE 3 ALL TAKERS
AND PHASE 3 VSI TAKERS ONLY
(in percent, unless noted)











HS GRAD 84.9 82.1
CHILDREN (avg) 2.1 2.0
HI TECH 38.0 39.7
Source: Figures derived from DMDC data for FY93
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C. LOGIT MODEL RESULTS
The results of the FY93 "Take" model shown in Table 4-7
are very close to the hypotheses developed in Chapter III.
MINORITY is negatively significant, supporting the premise
that minorities have higher retention rates than whites.
AFQT, HSD, and HITECH are all positively associated with the
take decision. NONGRAD turned out to be positively
significant, but was originally forecasted to have a negative
effect on bonus acceptance. The decreased Navy opportunities
for service members in the targeted ratings may infleence
individuals to accept a separation bonus even if they do not
have a high school diploma, and face fewer job opportunities
in the civilian sector. MARRIED was significant and negative,
as hypothesized, but CHILD was positive, which is the opposite
of the original expectation. From this model, having children
appeared to influence individuals into accepting a separation
bonus. The more children an individual has, the more likely
he/she is to accept. This may be because it is more favorable
to separate with a cash bonus rather than with nothing. YOS
and GRADE are both negatively significant, as predicted,
lending support to the original hypothesis that the closer
members draw towards retirement, the less likely they are to
separate. MALE was negative and significant, with this
variable reflecting lower retention rates for females. UNEMP,
ADVRATE, and MILSPS were all insignificant in this model.
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TABLE 4-7
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS ON DECISION TO TAKE
A SEPARATION BONUS, FY93 ELIGIBLE POPULATION
VARIABLE LOGIT WALD X2  Pr > X2 AProb/AXa
COEFFICIENT
INTERCEPT 1.480 -- -- --
MINORITY -. 570 78.1 .0001 -. 046
AFQT .005 18.7 .0001 .001
MALE -. 180 5.0 .0250 -. 014
YOS -. 324 1021.9 .0001 -. 028
GRADE -. 348 .3 .0001 -. 038
MARRIED -. 197 9.8 .0018 -. 018
CHILD .074 15.8 .0001 .006
MILSPS -. 062 .4 .5126 -. 006
NONGRAD .653 20.3 .0001 .055
HSD .403 9.5 .0021 .035
UNL'MP .018 1.2 .2657 .002
ADVRATE -. 007 2.3 .1312 -. 001
HITECH .200 19.0 .0001 .017
Model X2 = 1560.5 with 13 DF
a Computation from Ordinary Least Squares estimates
Source: Data derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel figures
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Table 4-8 provides the results of the same logit model run on
the subsample of service members who were eligible prior to
phase 3 of the program. This was done to determine if there
are noticeable differences in acceptance behavior between the
first two phases of the program and the program as a whole.
Comparing the results ot the logit model run on the FY93
takers prior to the expanded phase 3 eligibility (Table 4-8)
with the results of the model run on the total FY93 sample
(Table 4-7) shows that there is very little difference in the
impact of the selected variables on the decision to take a
separation bonus. The additional phase 3 eligibility
increased the total eligible sample size used in the model by
only 1402 additional observations, from n = 22,743 to n =
24,145, but had very little impact on the coefficients and
levels of significance. The only notable difference in the
results is in the variable ADVRATE, which appears positive and
significant in the Phase l&2 model and insignificant in the
model run on the total sample. The original hypothesis was
that ADVRATE would have a negative effect on the decision to
take a separation bonus. It is uncertain why the direction of
this variable's effect has changed. However, it should be




LOGIT RESULTS FOR TAKE DECISION FOR
FY93 SAMPLE OF PHASE 1 AND 2 ELIGIBLES
VARIABLE LOGIT WALD X2  Pr > X2 AProb/AXa
COEFFICIENT
INTERCEPT 1.570 -- -- --
MINORITY -. 581 80.7 .0001 -. 049
AFQT .005 19.3 .0001 .001
MALE -. 150 3.4 .0644 -. 012
YOS -. 325 986.6 .0001 -. 030
GRADE -. 411 86.0 .0001 -. 046
MARRIED -. 193 9.2 .0024 -. 018
CHILD .075 5.8 .0001 .007
MILSPS -. 046 .3 .6275 -. 004
NONGRAD .631 18.7 .0001 .056
HSD .386 8.6 .0034 .035
UNEMP -. 017 1.0 .3097 -. 002
ADVRATE .010 3.7 .0538 .001
HITECH .145 9.8 .0017 .013
Model X2 = 1566.1 with 13 DF
a Computation from Ordinary Least Squares estimates
Source: Derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel data
Table 4-9 presents a summary of selected results from the
FY92 Mehay/Kirby model [Ref.8:p.18] and from Tables 4-7 and 4-8
above, which permits a comparison of the FY92 and FY93 models.
The highlighted figures in Table 4-9 indicate variables that
had the same signs and significance levels in both the FY92
and FY93 models.
As shown in Table 4-9, the results of the FY93 model were
extremely close to both the FY92 Mehay/Kirby model and to the
results hypothesized in Chapter III. The difference in
significance associated with the MILSPS (military spouse)
variable may be attributed to the small number of observations
within the FY93 data that had military spouses (less than six
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percent). Differences in the UNEMP (unemployment) and ADVRATE
(advancement rate) variables may be attributed to fluctuations
in both numbers between FY92 and FY93.
TABLE 4-9
COMPARISON OF TAKE/NOT TAKE LOGIT MODEL RESULTS
FOR FY92 MEHAY/KIRBY MODEL, FY93 TOTAL SAMPLE,
AND FY93 PHASE l&2 ONLY
INDEPENDENT FY92 MODEL FY93 MODEL FY93 MODEL
VARIABLE (Mehay/Kirby)a (total sample) (phase 1&2)
MINORITY -. 565* -. 570" -. 581"
APQT .004* .005' .005"
MALE -. 365V1 -. 180" -. 150"
YOS -. 019' -. 324" -. 325'
GRADE(paygrade) -. 680* -. 348* -. 411-
MARRIED -. 175' -. 197- -. 193-
CEILD(children) .075* .074* .075*
MILSPS .263* -. 062 -. 046
NONGRAD .495* .653* .631'
HSD(HS grad) .140 .403* .386*
UNEMP(unrate) -. 053* .018 -. 017
ADVRATE -. 005* -. 007 .010*
HITECE .166' .200* .145'
* indicates that variable is significant at the .10 level
or better
a For a more in-depth look at the Mehay/Kirby model results,
see Shrinking the Force: Effects of the Navy's Separation
Incentive Program, by Stephen L. Mehay and Mary A. Kirby,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1993.
Differences in the results of the logit models set up to
analyze the VSI versus SSB decision were significantly
greater. Table 4-10 provides the results of the FY93 VSI
model, with Table 4-11 providing the results of the FY93 VSI
model with the PHASE3 variable added. As previously noted,
this variable is included to determine whether or not phase
was significant in the VSI decision.
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TABLE 4-10
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS FOR THE VSI VERSUS SSB DECISION
FOR THE FY93 TOTAL SAMPLE OF TAKERS
VARIABLE LOGIT WALD X2  Pr > X2 AProb/Axa
COEFFICIENT
INTERCEPT -4.558 -- -- --
MINORITY -. 560 6.6 .0101 -. 044
AFQT .001 .1 .8241 .000
MALE -. 081 .1 .7421 -. 007
YOS .228 97.8 .0001 .025
MARRIED -. 225 1.5 .2181 -. 020
CHILD .020 .1 .7000 .001
MILSPS -. 201 .4 .5192 .020
NONGRAD -. 041 .1 .8266 -. 007
Model X2 = 114.1 with 8 DF
a Computation from Ordinary Least Squares estimates
Source: Derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel data
TABLE 4-11
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS FOR THE VSI VERSUS SSB DECISION
FOR THE FY93 TOTAL SAMPLE OF TAKERS
WITH PHASE3 VARIABLE
VARIABLE LOGIT WALD X2  Pr > X2 AProb/AXa
COEFFICIENT
INTERCEPT -4.558 -- -- --
MINORITY -. 549 6.3 .0118 -. 043
AFQT .001 .1 .7374 .000
MALE -. 058 .1 .8141 -. 006
YOS .229 98.5 .0001 .025
MARRIED -. 231 1.6 .2074 -. 021
CHILD .018 .1 .7307 .001
MILSPS -. 211 .5 .4972 -. 021
NONGRAD -. 046 .1 .8049 -. 008
PHASE3 .326 5.1 .0244 .032
Model X2 = 118.9 with 9 DF
a Computation from Ordinary Least Squares estimation
Source: Derived from Bureau of Personnel data
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The only significant variables (.10 significance level or
better) in this model are MINORITY, YOS, and most importantly,
PHASE3. MINORITY was negatively significant, indicating that
minority status influenced individuals towards SSB rather than
VSI. YOS was significant in a positive direction, lending
support to the hypothesis that, as an individual's time in the
service increases, he/she has an increasing tendency to choose
VSI, as VSI more closely approximates "normal" retirement
payments. PHASE3 was positively significant, indicating that
phase 3 decision makers were drawn towards VSI. This supports
the hypothesis that the equated benefits package would be
significant on the margin in influencing individuals to choose
VSI over SSB. Table 4-12 shows the logit results of the
sample of individuals who made the VSI or SSB decision during
phase 3 of the FY93 program, for comparison purposes.
TABLE 4-12
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS FOR THE VSI VERSUS SSB DECISION
FOR FY93 PHASE 3 DECISION MAKERS
VARIABLE LOGIT WALD X2  Pr > X2 AProb/Axa
COEFFICIENT
INTERCEPT -4.808 -- -- --
MINORITY .194 .3 .6098 .019
AFQT .006 .9 .3436 .000
MALE .325 .5 .5006 -. 038
YOS .199 18.2 .0001 .025
MARRIED .267 .5 .4736 -. 032
CHILD -. 127 1.5 .2273 -. 015
MILSPS -. 716 1.2 .2664 -. 063
NONGRAD -. 303 .6 .4398 -. 038
Model X2 = 20.8 with 8 DF
a Computation from Ordinary Least Squares estimates
Source: Derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel data
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YOS was the only significant variable in the above model
of those individuals making the VSI or SSB decision during
phase 3 of the FY93 program. MINORITY, which is significant
in the model using the total sample, is not significant when
the sample included only phase 3 decision makers. Table 4-13
provides a brief summary of the FY93 logit model results
presented in Tables 4-10 and 4-12, along with selected results
from the FY92 Mehay/Kirby model [Ref.8:p.19]. This allows for
a comparison of variable significance, and whether the effect
was positive or negative, between the three "VSI versus SSB."
models.
TABLE 4-13
A COMPARISON OF VSI LOGIT MODEL COEFFICIENTS
FOR THE FY92 MEHAY/KIRBY MODEL AND FY93 MODELS
INDEPENDENT FY92 MODEL FY93 MODEL FY93 MODEL
VARIABLE (Mehay/Kirby)a (total sample) (phase 3)
MINORITY -. 204* -. 560* .193
AFQT .006* .001 .006
MALE -. 283* -. 081 .325
YOS .300* .228* .199*
MARRIED -. 272* -. 225 .267
CHILD -. 069* .020 -. 127
MILSPS .442* -. 201 -. 716
NONGRAD -. 203 -. 041 -. 303
* Indicates significant at the .10 level or better
a For a more in-depth look at the Mehay/Kirby model results,
see Shrinking the Farce: Effects of the Navy's Separation
Incentive Program, by Stephen L. Mehay and Mary A. Kirby,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1993.
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As shown in Table 4-13, the VSI results differ somewhat
between FY92 and FY93. The actual sample of VSI/SSB decision
makers was not quite as homogeneous as the population of
eligibles, which might account for some of the differences
between the FY92 and FY93 models. The logit model results for
the VSI/SSB decision for phase l&2 eligibles only are shown
in Table 4-14, for comparison purposes. Again, the results
are very close to those of the FY93 total sample. One
significant difference between the phase l&2 subsample and the
total sample is the variable MARRIED. It was hypothesized in
Chapter III to be negatively significant and this was also the
result in the Mehay/Kirby model. Although not significant in
the logit model for the FY93 total sample, it was negatively
significant, as originally hypothesized, in the logit model
for the phase 1&2 subsample.
TABLE 4-14
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS FOR THE VSI VERSUS SSB DECISION
FOR FY93 PHASE 1&2 DECISION MAKERS
VARIABLE LOGIT WALD X2  Pr > X2 AProb/AXa
COEFFICIENT
INTERCEPT -4.545 -- -- --
MINORITY -. 845 9.6 .0019 -. 057
AFQT .000 .0 .9469 .000
MALE -. 223 .6 .4391 -. 020
YOS .240 81.1 .0001 .025
MARRIED -. 383 3.3 .0699 -. 034
CHILD .062 1.0 .3117 -. 005
MILSPS -. 047 .0 .8966 -. 007
NONGRAD .028 .0 .8973 .000
Model X2 = 20.8 with 8 DF
a Computation from Ordinary Least Squares estimates
Source: Derived from Navy Bureau of Personnel data
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D. MARGINAL PROBABILITY RESULTS
The discussion in Chapter III concerning the "notional
person" provides additional background in understanding how
the attributes of the "notional person" are determined.
Chapter III also provides a brief discussion on the technique
of changing only one variable at a time, holding the others
constant, to determine the effect of that change on the
estimated probabilities. Table 4-15 provides the results of
the "notional person" calculations for the TAKE logit model
(Table 4-7) using the total sample of eligible service
members. Tables 4-15 and 4-IC outline several "notional
persons" and the likelihood that they would make the
respective decisions.
TABLE 4-15
MARGINAL PROBABILITY RESULTS FOR TAKE MODEL
DESCRIPTION OF CALCULATED PROBABILITY
INDIVIDUAL 0- TAKING A BONUS (%)
white male, single, HS grad 7.8
minority male, single, HS grad 4.6
white female, single, HS grad 9.3
white male, married, HS grad 6.6
white male, E-5, single, HS grad 10.8
* "Notional" individuals have average AFQT scores, are E-6s
(unless noted), and face the average state unemployment
rate and the average advancement rate for the entire
sample.
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The results shown in Table 4-15 are consistent with the
TAKE logit model results (Table 4-7). From the above
calculations, a minority male (all other variables held
constant) has one of the lowest calculated probabilities of
accepting a separation bonus. Also, being married in the
above probability calculations decreases the calculated
probability of accepting, which was evidenced earlier in Table
4-7. MARRIED, like MINORITY, was also negatively significant
in the Take logit model. The single female above had a high
calculated probability, as did the E-5 male, supporting the
results of the GRADE and MALE variables from Table 4-7. Table
4-16 shows the results of the "notional person" calculations
for the decision to accept VSI versus SSB, based on the logit
results shown in Table 4-11.
TABLE 4-16
VSI MARGINAL PROBABILITIES
DESCRIPTION OF CALCULATED PROBABILITY
INDIVIDUAL OF TAKING A BONUS (%)
white male, single, HS grad 11.0
minority male, single,HS grad 7.3
white female, single,HS grad 16.0
white male, married,HS grad 9.7
white male, single,HS grad, phase 3 15.8
* All individuals have AFQT scores and years of service that
equ.. the VSI/SSB decision sample average (67.6 and 11 YOS,
respectively). They are E-6s, unless noted.
54
Highlighted in Table 4-16 is the result of the change in
the PHASE3 variable, all other variables constant. Chapter
III hypothesized that this variable would be positive and
significant, which was in fact the result, as shown in Table
4-11. Table 4-16 shows one method of estimating how strong
the PHASE3 effect is calculated to be; all other variables
constant, changing the base case male to phase 3 increased the
estimated probability of choosing VSI over SSB by 4.8
percentage points.
E. FORECASTING RESULTS
Table 4-17 shows the results of the forecasting
calculations, using the equations outlined in the Methodology
section of this thesis. Calculations were done for both the
TAKE model and the VSI model. In addition, the ability of the
FY92 Mehay/Kirby model to predict by group was also tested.
Predictions for E-5 and E-6 subsamples were made. As Table 4-
17 shows, The Mehay/Kirby logit model proved to be highly
accurate at predicting actual acceptance behavior, using a
success threshold set at p > .5 as a taker, and p < .5 as a
non-taker. The decision threshold can be adjusted to increase
the probability of making an accurate prediction to better
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUS IONS
This thesis conducted an analysis of the voluntary
separation behavior of Navy enlisted personnel during FY93,
using taker data from October 1992 through February 1993. The
thesis built upon previous research concerning the FY92
VSI/SSB program conducted by Professor Stephen L. Mehay and LT
Mary Kirby, and supported many of the previous study's
findings. [Ref.8] As evidenced by both the FY92 Mehay/Kirby
model and the FY93 model, certain background variables
significantly influence an individual's decision to accept a
voluntary separation bonus. A comparison of the logit model
results between FY92 and FY93 reveal a great deal of
consistency in the effects and significance levels of the
explanatory variables. It can be concluded from this that the
populations of eligible service members between the two years
made similar decisions concerning voluntarily separation.
The hypotheses in Chapter III concerning the individual
variables and their effects on both the take decision and the
VSI decision were supported. In the current environment of
active duty force downsizing, recognizing which variables are
significant in this decision can make the application of the
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VSI/SSB program more efficient by providing an indication of
what the "take" behavior is likely to be for specific groups
of individuals.
The "notional person" calculations added additional
support to the ability of the logit model to estimate the
probability of acceptance for selected groups. It is
necessary for decision makers involved with both force
planning and budgeting to have an idea of how effective the
VSI/SSB program will be in the future. The model created in
this thesis can assist in this forecasting. As demonstrated
by the accuracy of the FY92 Mehay/Kirby model, the logit
results can accurately predict what the behavior will be for
selected eligible populations.
It is also important to view the results of the FY93
VSI/SSB program in light of other Navy programs and efforts.
Currently the Navy is focusing its efforts on maintaining, and
in some cases increasing, the female and minority
representation of its ranks. VSI/SSB participation can have
an impact on these efforts, as the models presented indicate
an increased likelihood of women accepting the separation
bonus. Though the numbers involved are small, it is still
necessary to evaluate their impact.
The effects of the PHASE3 variable on the likelihood of
accepting VSI demonstrated that the VSI or SSB decision is not
made solely on the method of payment or present value of the
payment stream (in the case of VSI). By adjusting the
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associated benefits, planners may be able to increase program
participation without incurring prohibitive cost increases.
B. RSCOMONDAT IONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
It was not within the scope of this thesis to determine
the effects of phase differences on VSI/SSB acceptance, other
than to analyze the effects of phase 3 on the FY93 VSI
decision. Further analysis into the phase effects, including
individual behavior across both program years, may lend
additional insight into the decision-making process.
Incorporating information from Navy separation
questionnaires into this type of analysis may be valuable in
more accurately determining the effects of non-pecuniary





An alternative approach to the two binomial logit models
of the take and choice decisions used in this thesis is to use
a single multinomial logit model. This type of model allows
analysts to model decision making when more than two options
are available to the decision maker. The multinomial logit
model assumes that sailors view the stay-leave and program-
choice choices as one single decision instead of a series of
decisions. The single decision involves three options:
"* Take VSI and leave.
"* Take SSB and leave.
"* Remain in the Navy (do not take).
The binomial logit models used in this thesis looked at
the Take/Not Take and VSI/SSB decisions as two separate and
sequential decisions. The decision maker is assumed to first
decide to take or not take a bonus (voluntarily separate). If
he/she does decide to separate, the next decision is which
bonus to take. The multinomial logit model approach is based
on the premise that the decision maker makes one decision but
with several options.
The multinomial logit modeling approach arbitrarily
selects one of the decisions as a "base" decision, and
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calculates probabilities as a ratio of each of the remaining
decisions to that base decision in a "log-odds" method shown
in the following equation: [Ref.7:p.5281
Ln (Pli/PBi)
where:
"* Pi = the probability of individual i choosing option 1
"* PB = the probability of individual i choosing the base
option
Thus, the model based on the three decisions outlined on
the previous page would have two equations to be estimated.
These two equations are presented below.
Ln (PvsI/PNoT TAKE) = a0 ++ 2X 2 i + Ei
where:
"* Pvs = probability of accepting VSI
"* PNOT TAKE = probability of not accepting (base decision)
0 a0 = constant
" all U2 = estimated coefficients
"* Xli, X2 i = independent variables
" Ei = stochastic error term
Ln (PSSB/PNOT TLKE) = 00 + OlXli + 32 X2 i + Ei
where:
"* PSSB = probability of accepting SSB
"* PNOT TAKE = base decision
" go = constant
"* 1, 02 = estimated Loefficients
"* Xli, X2 i = independent variables
" Ei = stochastic error term
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The model calculates each of the log-of the-odds ratios
shown in the previous two equations. Interpreting the results
is similar to that of the binomial logit model. The results
of the multinomial logit model specified for the choice
between VSI, SSB, or not to accept a bonus are shown in Table
A-i.
The signs indicate the effect of each variable on the
relative odds of making each decision (numerator) with respect
to the base decision (denominator). A negative sign, for
example, indicates that the explanatory variable decreases the
likelihood of making the decision shown in the numerator as
compared with the decision shown in the denominator.
TABLE A-I
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS FOR THE DECISION
BETWEEN VSI, SSB, OR NOT TO ACCEPT A BONUS
Independent Ln(PVSI/PNOT TAKE) Ln(PSSB/PNOT TAKE)
Variable
MINORITY -1.093* -. 524*
AFQT .005* .005*
MALE -. 126 -. 199*
YOS -. 050* .373*
GRADE -. 275* -. 346*
MARRIED -. 510* -. 133*
CHILD .092* .068*
MILSPS -. 153 -. 697
NONGRAD .164 .723*
HSD -. 180 .478*
UNEMP -. 058* -. 015
ADVRATE .045* .001
HITECH -. 239* .257*
Source: Derived from DMDC figures; n=24,145
* Indicates significance at the .10 level or better, based on
a one-tailed t-test with DF = 26, tcritical = 1.315
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When comparing the results of the two equations, the
coefficients provide an indication of the relative effects of
each independent variable on the log-odds of both sets of
decisions. The coefficient for MINORITY, for example,
indicates that minority status has a much stronger negative
effect on taking VSI than it has on taking SSB. Similarly,
the negative effect of YOS is much stronger on the probability
of taking SSB versus taking VSI. In some cases, the sign of
the variable differs between the two equations. High school
graduates and those in high tech ratings, for example, are
less likely to choose VSI, but more likely to take SSB.
Multinomial logit modeling is an additional method of
analysis that can be used to provide valuable insight into the
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